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Whatsdafus
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Originally posted by Cybershot
Originally posted by Whatsdafus

LMAO @ this whole post BUT mostly at Cybershot....

Originally posted by Cybershot



Hypocrites.

Say what you will about their crazy regime - and I implore you to do so - but condemning nuke tests when you have a stockpile of active warheads in the thousands is pretty funny.


LOL... so a Unstable regime that has since the 50's threaten the world is a better choice to have nukes vs a regime (up till the bush admin) has been seen by most of the world as a beacon of light and hope. USA has been condemning nuclear testing forever... its a way to stop a weapon from proliferating. There is no need for every country in the world to have nukes. if they did, it just increases the odds that the world will end in nuclear war.

BTW Had Stalin not acted like a nervous twit right after WW2, im sure the stockpiling of nukes would have been a lot different.

Cybershot = 0 points.

Then you said this about their crazy regime.....
Originally posted by Cybershot



And that has to be addressed. For sure.

How does one stop a country that didnt stop when it didnt have nukes and china's full backing.... that you now want to address when they do have Nukes and the full backing of China.

Seems to me you arent a man of history and just say how things "should" be.. this isnt lollipop land.

Cybershot = 0 points.

Originally posted by Cybershot



You had the luxury of testing them for 40 years...


Yea forty years.. but the Usa hasnt tested them since 1992. Testing Nukes is for one thing only... Improving yields and yield to weight ratios. In other words... Multi nuclear warheads.

So let me get this straight.... a few quotes back you are saying NK needs to be stopped... then you are saying countries should all be testing nukes, cause the US had 40 years of testing? GG

Cybershot = 0 points.

Originally posted by Cybershot



Honestly, they need to focus on the negatives of the regime in these stories, and not the fact that they have weapons that can hurt other countries. The point that should be pushed is they are a horrible regime, and are violating many human rights laws.

Edit: The world always takes notice when it's their asses on the firing line.


So... for 50 years, the world hasn't put sanctions on them for all the human right violations? The press never put of stories of all the human right violations? There arent any booked published about it? No people ever excaped from NK and told anyone anout it? No movies of teh week? you think this is something new? You really have no clue about history do you? This has been going on since the day the Korean war ended.. and has been addressed for decades from the world and the USA... but that lil sticking point of CHINA backing them... nothing was ever able to be done.

See lil one... history would show you that USA and SK had the Korean war won til China entered the war and pushed us both back and almost off the Korean peninsula.... we fought back and got it back to where the demilitarization zone is today. Had there been no china interference... there would be no NK today.

The reason the Nukes are such a big deal now is cause for almost 60 years NK has been insane.... now a insane person has a weapon that can kill millions in a second... that there is no defense against... that can destroy a area of the world for decades...

so keep assuming...

Cybershot = 0 points.

Originally posted by Cybershot



Stop spewing your garbage. The US is the protector of its investments, and rarely anything else.


So has every one of your post been (garbage).... What country isn't protecting it's interests? even WW2 we were doing the same thing. but the US has done more non investment protections then canada ever has.

Cybershot = 0 points.

Originally posted by Cybershot



I highly doubt his aids woul follow such an instruction.

BTW my stance it to aggressively dethrone that regime NOW, and not because of the damn nukes. But because of the starving people who are being brainwashed on a daily basis.


Again... no sense of history or why the Korean war happened in the first place.. Also many countries where people are being starved and brainwashed... where are you defending them? Canada, the worlds defender!!! with no army, air force or navy to worry about... talking about saving the world. easy to talk trash when your "big brother" has all the muscle, Eh? Would love to see Canada go into Dafur or Somalia solo and solve the worlds issues...

As for dethroning him now.... History, go read the North Korean war.

Cybershot = 0 points.

Originally posted by Cybershot



I think his aids would not follow through on an order to start a nuclear war for a dying man. Just my opinion, and not based on anything but human nature.


Ah... the thoughts of one who knows nada. His "aides" are his military generals... they arent his aides btw... they are the North Korean ARMED FORCES GENERALS. they run the show there.

Cybershot = 0 points.

Originally posted by Cybershot



a) no they can't be trusted, as proven by several bogus wars, lying to the people to get into such wars, and, until now, the only country to have used the nukes in an offensive manner.


You really need to learn history dude... cause the amount on talking out of your ass is insane.

1- USA warned Tokyo about the atomic weapons.
2- USA gave them multiple chances to surrender.
3- EVERYONE but you stated... people who have a clue... that dropping the bomb on japan saved lives.
4- those bombs were dropped more 60 years ago. wasn't you me or our parent who did that. so keep up with that arguement... you are winning.

Cybershot = 0 points.

Originally posted by Cybershot



Well...to my earlier point. They equipped the Afghans in order to fight the Russians, who needed control of the region in order to build a pipeline. This is what I mean by protecting their assets. Fighting covert wars and equipping highly dangerous people in order to maintain a dominant position is BS, if you ask me. Mind you own business on your own land, and things will work out. Start thrusting your peen into matters that don't need you, and you will engender hate and retaliation.


Ask the afghans who got stream rolled in the 80s who were the dangerous people.... BTW the Russians were the major world threat in the 80's... wars all over and had massive amounts of nukes and even threatened to use em... see Cuba.

Cybershot = 0 points.

Originally posted by Cybershot



Japan really wasn't a real threat tbh. Should have been on Germany imo, if anything.


LMAO..... LMAO.... LMAO.... LMAO

Again... HISTORY... read it.

You must be 16 and haven't studied history 101 yet. The atomic bomb was ready to be used AFTER Germany surrendered. A lil military thing called the Manhattan Project.

Ask anyone who was alive back then in the pacific theater on iwo jima or midway.... Oh yea ask the armys who were in Europe getting ready to be SHIPPED to japan who was the real threat was then.

Cybershot = 0 points.

Originally posted by Cybershot



They won't be able to send them to NY from NK, ever.


Please learn to use facts... stop talking out of your... you know what.

Taepodong-2
http://www.missilethreat.com/missilesoftheworld/id.166/missile_detail.asp


I guess hawaii alaska and the west coast doesnt count as United states... so dont you worry guys.. they cant hit NY!!!!

Cybershot = 0 points.

Originally posted by Cybershot



Prove it. Prove it that they were needlessly slaughtering people. Propaganda imo.
(He is talking about USSR going into Afghanistan and NOT killing their people.)

OMG HISTORY once again....

In 1979, the USSR took control of the Afghan capital, Kabul, and tried through the following decade to gain control over the whole country and its people. The invasion was a failure, costing thousands of lives and having serious consequences still felt today.

To better understand the reason for the Soviet invasion and failure, first one must understand the geography and culture in Afghanistan. The land is mountainous and arid. Jagged, impassable ranges divide the country and make travel difficult. Due to these physical divisions, the people are extremely provincial, with more loyalty to their specific clan or ethnic group than to a government or a country. The people are Muslims, and extremely religious and conservative. The majority ethnic group is the Pashtun, but there are over ten minority groups.

Starting in the 1950s, the USSR began giving aid to Afghanistan. The Soviets built roads, irrigation and even some oil pipelines. In the 1970s, a Communist party overthrew the monarchy and tried to institute social reforms. The rural populations saw land distribution and women's rights as alien to their traditional Islamic culture, a culture in which polygamy, covering of women, and blood for blood practices are accepted. The Communist governments in Kabul in the 1970s lacked the popular support of the rural population.

The Invasion

The Soviets sent troops into Afghanistan in 1979 for a number of reasons. First, they wished to expand their influence in Asia. They also wanted to preserve the Communist government that had been established in the 1970s, and was collapsing because of its lack of support other than in the military. Third, the Soviets wanted to protect their interests in Afghanistan from Iran and western nations.

The Soviets brought in over one hundred thousand soldiers, secured Kabul quickly and installed Babrak Karmal as their puppet leader. However, they were met with fierce resistance when they ventured out of their strongholds into the countryside. Resistance fighters, called mujahidin, saw the Christian or atheist Soviets controlling Afghanistan as a defilement of Islam as well as of their traditional culture. Proclaiming a "jihad"(holy war), they gained the support of the Islamic world. The US gave them weapons and money. The mujahidin employed guerrilla tactics against the Soviets. They would attack or raid quickly, then disappear into the mountains, causing great destruction without pitched battles. The fighters used whatever weapons they could take from the Soviets or were given by the US. Decentralized and scattered around Afghanistan, the mujahidin were like a poisonous snake without a head that could be cut off. There was no one strong central stronghold from which resistance operated.

Theres a quick history lesson for you... free of Propaganda. BTW im sure they took Kabul. without firing a single shot or killing anyone.
Your opinions as of yet... 1 out of 10 rating.

Cybershot = 0 points.

Originally posted by Cybershot



If Germany had indeed surrendered at that point (fuzzy on the timeline), you guys could have focused entirely on Japan. = not a threat.


May 7, 1945 - Date Germany officially surrendered to the world (fighting mainly stopped before then)
August 6, 1945 - Date US drops atomic bomb on Hiroshima
August 9, 1945 - Date Atom bomb hits Nagasaki

Yay!!! history and dates... Fuzzy math for cybershot.

Cybershot = 0 points.

Originally posted by Cybershot



I'm never in favour of bombing a city in order to send a message to the army. That's a massive and cowardly cop out.


Nope you are in favor of more brutal ways.

Cybershot = 0 points.

Originally posted by Cybershot



I love Americans, I have family in the US.

I hate how ignorant the majority of you are about World politics.


Thank god you are here cyber... so i can show everyone TRUE examples of ignorance about world politics and history.

Cybershot = 0 points.

Originally posted by Cybershot



Yea I mean, part of the reason to dethrone the regime is to SAVE the people.

Again.. read history and see North Korean War

Cybershot = 0 points.

Originally posted by Cybershot



Albert Einstein said "what have i done" or something like that after the creation of the atomic bomb, his advanced intellect doomed the world

Yep he did.

And most of the scientists involved in the Manhattan Project desperately tried to not have them dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki


And you realize Einstein Wrote the US government pushing them to CREATEnuclear bombs due to the fact Germany was making them. I know... HISTORY.. You really love to take things out of context and make your lil reality.

I will stop quoting the greatness know as Cybershot. It is obvious at how much he need to study history and learn what the past has taught us... mainly about NK china Russia and the USA.

Cyber, please stop posting about things you have a huge bias against and dont understand or never cared about learning. You didnt add one thing to this convo that was truthful.

Cybershot = 0 points.
How is this guy a mod???


Wow man, relax. These are my opinions. They have nothing to do with being a mod.

As for most of my points, I think you failed to see them. I'm not saying it's good to test bombs, I'm not saying they should even have a right to do so. I don't support them in any way.

What I said - please go back and check - is that it is hypocritical for an nation with thousands of warheads to condemn another for actions and policies they themselves practiced for...what 50 years (1943'ish to 1993'ish)?

edit: oh hey you're the guy I had to suspend because you wanted to bomb mecca. No wonder you put this little piece together.


LOL... opinions?
Look at you. reread this whole thread. look at how you attack people with your baseless and incorrect "opinions". like i said, you wanna comment on things... which you tend to do a lot... have a clue or two about what you are talking about.

I know facts are hard for you to understand and having poor opinions is why i called you out. Basic understanding of history is why i called you out. since its ok for you to say this to someone,
Originally posted by Cybershot

Stop spewing your garbage. The US is the protector of its investments, and rarely anything else.


i did the same to you.. except i backed everything up with FACTS. your opinions like this one....
Originally posted by Cybershot

Japan really wasn't a real threat tbh. Should have been on Germany imo, if anything.


That one was priceless... where did you pull that opinion out of?

or this one....
Originally posted by Cybershot

Prove it. Prove it that they were needlessly slaughtering people. Propaganda imo.


where do you get all these highly educated opinions? what facts didnt you base all this off of?

Yea you banned me, but i just shows that your lack of comprehending simple history shows that your opinions and judgment is piss poor. that's why i said your a crappy mod.

any other facts you want?
Edited by Whatsdafus on May 28, 2009 23:23:03
 
Whatsdafus
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6th missile tested

http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/05/29/nkorea.missile/index.html
Edited by Whatsdafus on May 29, 2009 06:11:01
 
Cybershot
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Whatsdafus, I know what I'm talking about, you can keep talking trash until you're blue in the face, but it won't make it true.

a). Yes I still believe the US gov. likes to protect their interests first and foremost. No I don't think that's a horrible thing, but shouting out that the great USA is the "protector of the world" is only half the message. Claiming they have only fought selfless, peacekeeping wars is ignorant.
b). Japan had a strong and overachieving army/navy. They were a power in the region, and yes they used aggressive tactics. They were able to occupy parts of China for few years during the war, and of course they had been very aggressive with Korea for a long time. But come on. Germany had surrendered, the Allies' troupes were spread thin, yes, but they could have focused on Japan. It would have cost the lives of soldiers to continue to wage war with Japan, but I maintain that I am never in favor of bombing civilian centers. Twist that however you like, it's what I believe.

Also, about your various attacks:

a) I never said this:
Originally posted by Cybershot
Albert Einstein said "what have i done" or something like that after the creation of the atomic bomb, his advanced intellect doomed the world
Yep he did.
And most of the scientists involved in the Manhattan Project desperately tried to not have them dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki


Using a wall of text to try to hide a misquoted attack is classy.

b) I said they could never reach NY with the tech they have or are close to developing. It's a fact. You argue that by saying they can reach Alaska. That's true, they could. I never argued against that. Twisting of words much?
c) Whatsdafus: So has every one of your post been (garbage).... What country isn't protecting it's interests? even WW2 we were doing the same thing. but the US has done more non investment protections then canada ever has.
Please go read up about our peacekeeping missions and nato involvement. We were involved in WW2 far before you guys conveniently joined in, so save your BS.

I'm done arguing in this thread with you wats. You have it out for me because of your (very well deserved) ban, and you'll twist my words every which way. This isn't my field of expertise anyway, as you've seen I messed up some dates and so on, but I maintain my main points, for which I do have factual arguments to back up.

 
Whatsdafus
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I dont have to twist your words... i posted them clear as day for others to laugh at
 
Fat Colin
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Cybershot. I agree the war to take Japan without the bomb would have been possible. Russia was right there with us if we needed to invade, and if we didn't use the nukes we could control the spread of them much easier due to the fact we had one but we chose to invade instead of bombing them.

Also on the Main Island of Japan they were feeling food shortages and supply shortages and with situations like that an invasion might stir public sentiment against Tojo and cause riots.
 
Purextc
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I'm not bias... I say nukem all.
 
Whatsdafus
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Originally posted by Regular-Sized-Colin
Cybershot. I agree the war to take Japan without the bomb would have been possible. Russia was right there with us if we needed to invade, and if we didn't use the nukes we could control the spread of them much easier due to the fact we had one but we chose to invade instead of bombing them.

Also on the Main Island of Japan they were feeling food shortages and supply shortages and with situations like that an invasion might stir public sentiment against Tojo and cause riots.


No one said it wasnt impossible...

Cause it was...

But the whole point was more lives were saved from dropping the bomb then not.

Look at Iwo Jima. they fought to the last man. the Japanese didnt believe in surrendering.. it was fight to the death. they even said that about japan if we invaded... they would have fought forever.
 
Fat Colin
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Originally posted by Whatsdafus
Originally posted by Regular-Sized-Colin

Cybershot. I agree the war to take Japan without the bomb would have been possible. Russia was right there with us if we needed to invade, and if we didn't use the nukes we could control the spread of them much easier due to the fact we had one but we chose to invade instead of bombing them.

Also on the Main Island of Japan they were feeling food shortages and supply shortages and with situations like that an invasion might stir public sentiment against Tojo and cause riots.


No one said it wasnt impossible...

Cause it was...

But the whole point was more lives were saved from dropping the bomb then not.

Look at Iwo Jima. they fought to the last man. the Japanese didnt believe in surrendering.. it was fight to the death. they even said that about japan if we invaded... they would have fought forever.


But instead of killing those that were paid and trained to die we killed innocents. An invasion would have been costly but we could also blockade them them and invade if needed
 
Whatsdafus
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Originally posted by Regular-Sized-Colin
Originally posted by Whatsdafus

Originally posted by Regular-Sized-Colin


Cybershot. I agree the war to take Japan without the bomb would have been possible. Russia was right there with us if we needed to invade, and if we didn't use the nukes we could control the spread of them much easier due to the fact we had one but we chose to invade instead of bombing them.

Also on the Main Island of Japan they were feeling food shortages and supply shortages and with situations like that an invasion might stir public sentiment against Tojo and cause riots.


No one said it wasnt impossible...

Cause it was...

But the whole point was more lives were saved from dropping the bomb then not.

Look at Iwo Jima. they fought to the last man. the Japanese didnt believe in surrendering.. it was fight to the death. they even said that about japan if we invaded... they would have fought forever.


But instead of killing those that were paid and trained to die we killed innocents. An invasion would have been costly but we could also blockade them them and invade if needed


1. ask all the people who were innocent that the jap's raped, killed and deformed... you dont understand.. the jap's back then were really bad people. ask any Pinoy, chinese, or SE asian who was alive back then about what japanese did to woman and children. So all views about japs back then were out the window

2. Do you realize how many americans died in WW@ before August 6th 1945? The war cost us too much. why should we have to pay the ultimate price for a war the japs started?

3. dont forget Pearl harbor.
 
Fat Colin
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Originally posted by Whatsdafus
Originally posted by Regular-Sized-Colin

Originally posted by Whatsdafus


Originally posted by Regular-Sized-Colin



Cybershot. I agree the war to take Japan without the bomb would have been possible. Russia was right there with us if we needed to invade, and if we didn't use the nukes we could control the spread of them much easier due to the fact we had one but we chose to invade instead of bombing them.

Also on the Main Island of Japan they were feeling food shortages and supply shortages and with situations like that an invasion might stir public sentiment against Tojo and cause riots.


No one said it wasnt impossible...

Cause it was...

But the whole point was more lives were saved from dropping the bomb then not.

Look at Iwo Jima. they fought to the last man. the Japanese didnt believe in surrendering.. it was fight to the death. they even said that about japan if we invaded... they would have fought forever.


But instead of killing those that were paid and trained to die we killed innocents. An invasion would have been costly but we could also blockade them them and invade if needed


1. ask all the people who were innocent that the jap's raped, killed and deformed... you dont understand.. the jap's back then were really bad people. ask any Pinoy, chinese, or SE asian who was alive back then about what japanese did to woman and children. So all views about japs back then were out the window

2. Do you realize how many americans died in WW@ before August 6th 1945? The war cost us too much. why should we have to pay the ultimate price for a war the japs started?

3. dont forget Pearl harbor.


You don't realize an invasion would have also included Russian support who at the time were making peace talks with Japan.

In response to number one. So civilians of one country are supposed to be punished because of what their military did when they had no say in the matter at all.
 
Whatsdafus
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i will post this long ass stroy.... so you can understand history and stop this back and forth
 
Whatsdafus
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The sixtieth anniversary of Hiroshima seems to be shaping up as a subdued affair--though not for any lack of significance. A survey of news editors in 1999 ranked the dropping of the atomic bomb on August 6, 1945, first among the top one hundred stories of the twentieth century. And any thoughtful list of controversies in American history would place it near the top again. It was not always so. In 1945, an overwhelming majority of Americans regarded as a matter of course that the United States had used atomic bombs to end the Pacific war. They further believed that those bombs had actually ended the war and saved countless lives. This set of beliefs is now sometimes labeled by academic historians the "traditionalist" view. One unkindly dubbed it the "patriotic orthodoxy."

But in the 1960s, what were previously modest and scattered challenges of the decision to use the bombs began to crystallize into a rival canon. The challengers were branded "revisionists," but this is inapt. Any historian who gains possession of significant new evidence has a duty to revise his appreciation of the relevant events. These challengers are better termed critics.

The critics share three fundamental premises. The first is that Japan's situation in 1945 was catastrophically hopeless. The second is that Japan's leaders recognized that fact and were seeking to surrender in the summer of 1945. The third is that thanks to decoded Japanese diplomatic messages, American leaders knew that Japan was about to surrender when they unleashed needless nuclear devastation.
The critics divide over what prompted the decision to drop the bombs in spite of the impending surrender, with the most provocative arguments focusing on Washington's desire to intimidate the Kremlin. Among an important stratum of American society--and still more perhaps abroad--the critics' interpretation displaced the traditionalist view.

These rival narratives clashed in a major battle over the exhibition of the Enola Gay, the airplane from which the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, at the Smithsonian Institution in 1995. That confrontation froze many people's understanding of the competing views. Since then, however, a sheaf of new archival discoveries and publications has expanded our understanding of the events of August 1945. This new evidence requires serious revision of the terms of the debate. What is perhaps the most interesting feature of the new findings is that they make a case President Harry S. Truman deliberately chose not to make publicly in defense of his decision to use the bomb.

When scholars began to examine the archival records in the 1960s, some intuited quite correctly that the accounts of their decision-making that Truman and members of his administration had offered in 1945 were at least incomplete. And if Truman had refused to disclose fully his thinking, these scholars reasoned, it must be because the real basis for his choices would undermine or even delegitimize his decisions. It scarcely seemed plausible to such critics--or to almost anyone else--that there could be any legitimate reason that the U.S. government would have concealed at the time, and would continue to conceal, powerful evidence that supported and explained the president's decisions.

But beginning in the 1970s, we have acquired an array of new evidence from Japan and the United States. By far the most important single body of this new evidence consists of secret radio intelligence material, and what it highlights is the painful dilemma faced by Truman and his administration. In explaining their decisions to the public, they deliberately forfeited their best evidence. They did so because under the stringent security restrictions guarding radio intercepts, recipients of this intelligence up to and including the president were barred from retaining copies of briefing documents, from making any public reference to them whatsoever at the time or in their memoirs, and from retaining any record of what they had seen or what they had concluded from it. With a handful of exceptions, they obeyed these rules, both during the war and thereafter.

Collectively, the missing information is known as The Ultra Secret of World War II (after the title of a breakthrough book by Frederick William Winterbotham published in 1974). Ultra was the name given to what became a vast and enormously efficient Allied radio intelligence organization, which secretly unveiled masses of information for senior policymakers. Careful listening posts snatched copies of millions of cryptograms from the air. Code breakers then extracted the true text. The extent of the effort is staggering. By the summer of 1945, Allied radio intelligence was breaking into a million messages a month from the Japanese Imperial Army alone, and many thousands from the Imperial Navy and Japanese diplomats.

All of
this effort and expertise would be squandered if the raw intercepts were not properly translated and analyzed and their disclosures distributed to those who needed to know. This is where Pearl Harbor played a role. In the aftermath of that disastrous surprise attack, Secretary of War Henry Stimson recognized that the fruits of radio intelligence were not being properly exploited. He set Alfred McCormack, a top-drawer lawyer with experience in handling complex cases, to the task of formulating a way to manage the distribution of information from Ultra. The system McCormack devised called for funneling all radio intelligence to a handful of extremely bright individuals who would evaluate the flood of messages, correlate them with all other sources, and then write daily summaries for policymakers.

By mid-1942, McCormack's scheme had evolved into a daily ritual that continued to the end of the war--and is in essence the system still in effect today. Every day, analysts prepared three mimeographed newsletters. Official couriers toting locked pouches delivered one copy of each summary to a tiny list of authorized recipients around the Washington area. (They also retrieved the previous day's distribution, which was then destroyed except for a file copy.) Two copies of each summary went to the White House, for the president and his chief of staff. Other copies went to a very select group of officers and civilian officials in the War and Navy Departments, the British Staff Mission, and the State Department. What is almost as interesting is the list of those not entitled to these top-level summaries: the vice president, any cabinet official outside the select few in the War, Navy, and State Departments, anyone in the Office of Strategic Services or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or anyone in the Manhattan Project building the atomic bomb, from Major General Leslie Groves on down.

The three daily summaries were called the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary, the "Magic" Far East Summary, and the European Summary. ("Magic" was a code word coined by the U.S. Army's chief signal officer, who called his code breakers "magicians" and their product "Magic." The term "Ultra" came from the British and has generally prevailed as the preferred term among historians, but in 1945 "Magic" remained the American designation for radio intelligence, particularly that concerning the Japanese.) The "Magic" Diplomatic Summary covered intercepts from foreign diplomats all over the world. The "Magic" Far East Summary presented information on Japan's military, naval, and air situation. The European Summary paralleled the Far East summary in coverage and need not detain us. Each summary read like a newsmagazine. There were headlines and brief articles usually containing extended quotations from intercepts and commentary. The commentary was critical: Since no recipient retained any back issues, it was up to the editors to explain how each day's developments fitted into the broader picture.

When a complete set of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary for the war years was first made public in 1978, the text contained a large number of redacted (literally whited out) passages. The critics reasonably asked whether the blanks concealed devastating revelations. Release of a nonredacted complete set in 1995 disclosed that the redacted areas had indeed contained a devastating revelation--but not about the use of the atomic bombs. Instead, the redacted areas concealed the embarrassing fact that Allied radio intelligence was reading the codes not just of the Axis powers, but also of some 30 other governments, including allies like France.

The diplomatic intercepts included, for example, those of neutral diplomats or attachés stationed in Japan. Critics highlighted a few nuggets from this trove in the 1978 releases, but with the complete release, we learned that there were only 3 or 4 messages suggesting the possibility of a compromise peace, while no fewer than 13 affirmed that Japan fully intended to fight to the bitter end. Another page in the critics' canon emphasized a squad of Japanese diplomats in Europe, from Sweden to the Vatican, who attempted to become peace entrepreneurs in their contacts with American officials. As the editors of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary correctly made clear to American policymakers during the war, however, not a single one of these men (save one we will address shortly) possessed actual authority to act for the Japanese government.

An inner cabinet in Tokyo authorized Japan's only officially sanctioned diplomatic initiative. The Japanese dubbed this inner cabinet the Big Six because it comprised just six men: Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, Army Minister Korechika Anami, Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, and the chiefs of staff of the Imperial Army (General Yoshijiro Umezu) and Imperial Navy (Admiral Soemu Toyoda). In complete secrecy, the Big Six agreed on an approach to the Soviet Union in June 1945. This was not to ask the Soviets to deliver a "We surrender" note; rather, it aimed to enlist the Soviets as mediators to negotiate an end to the war satisfactory to the Big Six--in other words, a peace on terms satisfactory to the dominant militarists. Their minimal goal was not confined to guaranteed retention of the Imperial Institution; they also insisted on preservation of the old militaristic order in Japan, the one in which they ruled.

The conduit for this initiative was Japan's ambassador in Moscow, Naotake Sato. He communicated with Foreign Minister Togo--and, thanks to code breaking, with American policymakers. Ambassador Sato emerges in the intercepts as a devastating cross-examiner ruthlessly unmasking for history the feebleness of the whole enterprise. Sato immediately told Togo that the Soviets would never bestir themselves on behalf of Japan. The foreign minister could only insist that Sato follow his instructions. Sato demanded to know whether the government and the military supported the overture and what its legal basis was--after all, the official Japanese position, adopted in an Imperial Conference in June 1945 with the emperor's sanction, was a fight to the finish. The ambassador also demanded that Japan state concrete terms to end the war, otherwise the effort could not be taken seriously. Togo responded evasively that the "directing powers" and the government had authorized the effort--he did not and could not claim that the military in general supported it or that the fight-to-the-end policy had been replaced. Indeed, Togo added: "Please bear particularly in mind, however, that we are not seeking the Russians' mediation for anything like an unconditional surrender."

This last comment triggered a fateful exchange. Critics have pointed out correctly that both Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew (the former U.S. ambassador to Japan and the leading expert on that nation within the government) and Secretary of War Henry Stimson advised Truman that a guarantee that the Imperial Institution would not be eliminated could prove essential to obtaining Japan's surrender. The critics further have argued that if only the United States had made such a guarantee, Japan would have surrendered. But when Foreign Minister Togo informed Ambassador Sato that Japan was not looking for anything like unconditional surrender, Sato promptly wired back a cable that the editors of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary made clear to American policymakers "advocate[s] unconditional surrender provided the Imperial House is preserved." Togo's reply, quoted in the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary of July 22, 1945, was adamant: American policymakers could read for themselves Togo's rejection of Sato's proposal--with not even a hint that a guarantee of the Imperial House would be a step in the right direction. Any rational person following this exchange would conclude that modifying the demand for unconditional surrender to include a promise to preserve the Imperial House would not secure Japan's surrender.

Togo's initial messages--indicating that the emperor himself endorsed the effort to secure Soviet mediation and was prepared to send his own special envoy--elicited immediate attention from the editors of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary, as well as Under Secretary of State Grew. Because of Grew's documented advice to Truman on the importance of the Imperial Institution, critics feature him in the role of the sage counsel. What the intercept evidence discloses is that Grew reviewed the Japanese effort and concurred with the U.S. Army's chief of intelligence, Major General Clayton Bissell, that the effort most likely represented a ploy to play on American war weariness. They deemed the possibility that it manifested a serious effort by the emperor to end the war "remote." Lest there be any doubt about Grew's mindset, as late as August 7, the day after Hiroshima, Grew drafted a memorandum with an oblique reference to radio intelligence again affirming his view that Tokyo still was not close to peace.

Starting with the publication of excerpts from the diaries of James Forrestal in 1951, the contents of a few of the diplomatic intercepts were revealed, and for decades the critics focused on these. But the release of the complete (unredacted) "Magic" Far East Summary, supplementing the Diplomatic Summary, in the 1990s revealed that the diplomatic messages amounted to a mere trickle by comparison with the torrent of military intercepts. The intercepts of Japanese Imperial Army and Navy messages disclosed without exception that Japan's armed forces were determined to fight a final Armageddon battle in the homeland against an Allied invasion. The Japanese called this strategy Ketsu Go (Operation Decisive). It was founded on the premise that American morale was brittle and could be shattered by heavy losses in the initial invasion. American politicians would then gladly negotiate an end to the war far more generous than unconditional surrender. Ultra was even more alarming in what it revealed about Japanese knowledge of American military plans. Intercepts demonstrated that the Japanese had correctly anticipated precisely where U.S. forces intended to land on Southern Kyushu in November 1945 (Operation Olympic). American planning for the Kyushu assault reflected adherence to the military rule of thumb that the attacker should outnumber the defender at least three to one to assure success at a reasonable cost. American estimates projected that on the date of the landings, the Japanese would have only three of their six field divisions on all of Kyushu in the southern target area where nine American divisions would push ashore. The estimates allowed that the Japanese would possess just 2,500 to 3,000 planes total throughout Japan to face Olympic. American aerial strength would be over four times greater.

From mid-July onwards, Ultra intercepts exposed a huge military buildup on Kyushu. Japanese ground forces exceeded prior estimates by a factor of four. Instead of 3 Japanese field divisions deployed in southern Kyushu to meet the 9 U.S. divisions, there were 10 Imperial Army divisions plus additional brigades. Japanese air forces exceeded prior estimates by a factor of two to four. Instead of 2,500 to 3,000 Japanese aircraft, estimates varied between about 6,000 and 10,000. One intelligence officer commented that the Japanese defenses threatened "to grow to [the] point where we attack on a ratio of one (1) to one (1) which is not the recipe for victory."

Concurrent with the publication of the radio intelligence material, additional papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been released in the last decade. From these, it is clear that there was no true consensus among the Joint Chiefs of Staff about an invasion of Japan. The Army, led by General George C. Marshall, believed that the critical factor in achieving American war aims was time. Thus, Marshall and the Army advocated an invasion of the Home Islands as the fastest way to end the war. But the long-held Navy view was that the critical factor in achieving American war aims was casualties. The Navy was convinced that an invasion would be far too costly to sustain the support of the American people, and hence believed that blockade and bombardment were the sound course.

The picture becomes even more complex than previously understood because it emerged that the Navy chose to postpone a final showdown over these two strategies. The commander in chief of the U.S. fleet, Admiral Ernest King, informed his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April 1945 that he did not agree that Japan should be invaded. He concurred only that the Joint Chiefs must issue an invasion order immediately to create that option for the fall. But King predicted that the Joint Chiefs would revisit the issue of whether an invasion was wise in August or September. Meanwhile, two months of horrendous fighting ashore on Okinawa under skies filled with kamikazes convinced the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, that he should withdraw his prior support for at least the invasion of Kyushu. Nimitz informed King of this change in his views in strict confidence.

In August, the Ultra revelations propelled the Army and Navy towards a showdown over the invasion. On August 7 (the day after Hiroshima, which no one expected to prompt a quick surrender), General Marshall reacted to weeks of gathering gloom in the Ultra evidence by asking General Douglas MacArthur, who was to command what promised to be the greatest invasion in history, whether invading Kyushu in November as planned still looked sensible. MacArthur replied, amazingly, that he did not believe the radio intelligence! He vehemently urged the invasion should go forward as planned. (This, incidentally, demolishes later claims that MacArthur thought the Japanese were about to surrender at the time of Hiroshima.) On August 9 (the day the second bomb was dropped, on Nagasaki), King gathered the two messages in the exchange between Marshall and MacArthur and sent them to Nimitz. King told Nimitz to provide his views on the viability of invading Kyushu, with a copy to MacArthur. Clearly, nothing that had transpired since May would have altered Nimitz's view that Olympic was unwise. Ultra now made the invasion appear foolhardy to everyone but MacArthur. But King had not placed a deadline on Nimitz's response, and the Japanese surrender on August 15 allowed Nimitz to avoid starting what was certain to be one of the most tumultuous interservice battles of the whole war.

What this evidence illuminates is that one central tenet of the traditionalist view is wrong--but with a twist. Even with the full ration of caution that any historian should apply anytime he ventures comments on paths history did not take, in this instance it is now clear that the long-held belief that Operation Olympic loomed as a certainty is mistaken. Truman's reluctant endorsement of the Olympic invasion at a meeting in June 1945 was based in key part on the fact that the Joint Chiefs had presented it as their unanimous recommendation. (King went along with Marshall at the meeting, presumably because he deemed it premature to wage a showdown fight. He did comment to Truman that, of course, any invasion authorized then could be canceled later.) With the Navy's withdrawal of support, the terrible casualties in Okinawa, and the appalling radio-intelligence picture of the Japanese buildup on Kyushu, Olympic was not going forward as planned and authorized--period. But this evidence also shows that the demise of Olympic came not because it was deemed unnecessary, but because it had become unthinkable. It is hard to imagine anyone who could have been president at the time (a spectrum that includes FDR, Henry Wallace, William O. Douglas, Harry Truman, and Thomas Dewey) failing to authorize use of the atomic bombs in this circumstance. Japanese historians uncovered another key element of the story. After Hiroshima (August 6), Soviet entry into the war against Japan (August 8), and Nagasaki (August 9), the emperor intervened to break a deadlock within the government and decide that Japan must surrender in the early hours of August 10. The Japanese Foreign Ministry dispatched a message to the United States that day stating that Japan would accept the Potsdam Declaration, "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler." This was not, as critics later asserted, merely a humble request that the emperor retain a modest figurehead role. As Japanese historians writing decades after the war emphasized, the demand that there be no compromise of the "prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler" as a precondition for the surrender was a demand that the United States grant the emperor veto power over occupation reforms and continue the rule of the old order in Japan. Fortunately, Japan specialists in the State Department immediately realized the actual purpose of this language and briefed Secretary of State James Byrnes, who insisted properly that this maneuver must be defeated. The maneuver further underscores the fact that right to the very end, the Japanese pursued twin goals: not only the preservation of the imperial system, but also preservation of the old order in Japan that had launched a war of aggression that killed 17 million.

This brings us to another aspect of history that now very belatedly has entered the controversy. Several American historians led by Robert Newman have insisted vigorously that any assessment of the end of the Pacific war must include the horrifying consequences of each continued day of the war for the Asian populations trapped within Japan's conquests. Newman calculates that between a quarter million and 400,000 Asians, overwhelmingly noncombatants, were dying each month the war continued. Newman et al. challenge whether an assessment of Truman's decision can highlight only the deaths of noncombatant civilians in the aggressor nation while ignoring much larger death tolls among noncombatant civilians in the victim nations.

There are a good many more points that now extend our understanding beyond the debates of 1995. But it is clear that all three of the critics' central premises are wrong. The Japanese did not see their situation as catastrophically hopeless. They were not seeking to surrender, but pursuing a negotiated end to the war that preserved the old order in Japan, not just a figurehead emperor. Finally, thanks to radio intelligence, American leaders, far from knowing that peace was at hand, understood--as one analytical piece in the "Magic" Far East Summary stated in July 1945, after a review of both the military and diplomatic intercepts--that "until the Japanese leaders realize that an invasion can not be repelled, there is little likelihood that they will accept any peace terms satisfactory to the Allies." This cannot be improved upon as a succinct and accurate summary of the military and diplomatic realities of the summer of 1945.

The displacement of the so-called traditionalist view within important segments of American opinion took several decades to accomplish. It will take a similar span of time to displace the critical orthodoxy that arose in the 1960s and prevailed roughly through the 1980s, and replace it with a richer appreciation for the realities of 1945. But the clock is ticking.
 
Ted Buckland
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Originally posted by Whatsdafus
Originally posted by Regular-Sized-Colin

Originally posted by Whatsdafus


Originally posted by Regular-Sized-Colin



Cybershot. I agree the war to take Japan without the bomb would have been possible. Russia was right there with us if we needed to invade, and if we didn't use the nukes we could control the spread of them much easier due to the fact we had one but we chose to invade instead of bombing them.

Also on the Main Island of Japan they were feeling food shortages and supply shortages and with situations like that an invasion might stir public sentiment against Tojo and cause riots.


No one said it wasnt impossible...

Cause it was...

But the whole point was more lives were saved from dropping the bomb then not.

Look at Iwo Jima. they fought to the last man. the Japanese didnt believe in surrendering.. it was fight to the death. they even said that about japan if we invaded... they would have fought forever.


But instead of killing those that were paid and trained to die we killed innocents. An invasion would have been costly but we could also blockade them them and invade if needed


1. ask all the people who were innocent that the jap's raped, killed and deformed... you dont understand.. the jap's back then were really bad people. ask any Pinoy, chinese, or SE asian who was alive back then about what japanese did to woman and children. So all views about japs back then were out the window

2. Do you realize how many americans died in WW@ before August 6th 1945? The war cost us too much. why should we have to pay the ultimate price for a war the japs started?

3. dont forget Pearl harbor.


pearl harbour was a military base primarely... its not like nuking a fucking city
 
Ted Buckland
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Originally posted by Whatsdafus
The sixtieth anniversary of Hiroshima seems to be shaping up as a subdued affair--though not for any lack of significance. A survey of news editors in 1999 ranked the dropping of the atomic bomb on August 6, 1945, first among the top one hundred stories of the twentieth century. And any thoughtful list of controversies in American history would place it near the top again. It was not always so. In 1945, an overwhelming majority of Americans regarded as a matter of course that the United States had used atomic bombs to end the Pacific war. They further believed that those bombs had actually ended the war and saved countless lives. This set of beliefs is now sometimes labeled by academic historians the "traditionalist" view. One unkindly dubbed it the "patriotic orthodoxy."

But in the 1960s, what were previously modest and scattered challenges of the decision to use the bombs began to crystallize into a rival canon. The challengers were branded "revisionists," but this is inapt. Any historian who gains possession of significant new evidence has a duty to revise his appreciation of the relevant events. These challengers are better termed critics.

The critics share three fundamental premises. The first is that Japan's situation in 1945 was catastrophically hopeless. The second is that Japan's leaders recognized that fact and were seeking to surrender in the summer of 1945. The third is that thanks to decoded Japanese diplomatic messages, American leaders knew that Japan was about to surrender when they unleashed needless nuclear devastation.
The critics divide over what prompted the decision to drop the bombs in spite of the impending surrender, with the most provocative arguments focusing on Washington's desire to intimidate the Kremlin. Among an important stratum of American society--and still more perhaps abroad--the critics' interpretation displaced the traditionalist view.

These rival narratives clashed in a major battle over the exhibition of the Enola Gay, the airplane from which the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, at the Smithsonian Institution in 1995. That confrontation froze many people's understanding of the competing views. Since then, however, a sheaf of new archival discoveries and publications has expanded our understanding of the events of August 1945. This new evidence requires serious revision of the terms of the debate. What is perhaps the most interesting feature of the new findings is that they make a case President Harry S. Truman deliberately chose not to make publicly in defense of his decision to use the bomb.

When scholars began to examine the archival records in the 1960s, some intuited quite correctly that the accounts of their decision-making that Truman and members of his administration had offered in 1945 were at least incomplete. And if Truman had refused to disclose fully his thinking, these scholars reasoned, it must be because the real basis for his choices would undermine or even delegitimize his decisions. It scarcely seemed plausible to such critics--or to almost anyone else--that there could be any legitimate reason that the U.S. government would have concealed at the time, and would continue to conceal, powerful evidence that supported and explained the president's decisions.

But beginning in the 1970s, we have acquired an array of new evidence from Japan and the United States. By far the most important single body of this new evidence consists of secret radio intelligence material, and what it highlights is the painful dilemma faced by Truman and his administration. In explaining their decisions to the public, they deliberately forfeited their best evidence. They did so because under the stringent security restrictions guarding radio intercepts, recipients of this intelligence up to and including the president were barred from retaining copies of briefing documents, from making any public reference to them whatsoever at the time or in their memoirs, and from retaining any record of what they had seen or what they had concluded from it. With a handful of exceptions, they obeyed these rules, both during the war and thereafter.

Collectively, the missing information is known as The Ultra Secret of World War II (after the title of a breakthrough book by Frederick William Winterbotham published in 1974). Ultra was the name given to what became a vast and enormously efficient Allied radio intelligence organization, which secretly unveiled masses of information for senior policymakers. Careful listening posts snatched copies of millions of cryptograms from the air. Code breakers then extracted the true text. The extent of the effort is staggering. By the summer of 1945, Allied radio intelligence was breaking into a million messages a month from the Japanese Imperial Army alone, and many thousands from the Imperial Navy and Japanese diplomats.

All of
this effort and expertise would be squandered if the raw intercepts were not properly translated and analyzed and their disclosures distributed to those who needed to know. This is where Pearl Harbor played a role. In the aftermath of that disastrous surprise attack, Secretary of War Henry Stimson recognized that the fruits of radio intelligence were not being properly exploited. He set Alfred McCormack, a top-drawer lawyer with experience in handling complex cases, to the task of formulating a way to manage the distribution of information from Ultra. The system McCormack devised called for funneling all radio intelligence to a handful of extremely bright individuals who would evaluate the flood of messages, correlate them with all other sources, and then write daily summaries for policymakers.

By mid-1942, McCormack's scheme had evolved into a daily ritual that continued to the end of the war--and is in essence the system still in effect today. Every day, analysts prepared three mimeographed newsletters. Official couriers toting locked pouches delivered one copy of each summary to a tiny list of authorized recipients around the Washington area. (They also retrieved the previous day's distribution, which was then destroyed except for a file copy.) Two copies of each summary went to the White House, for the president and his chief of staff. Other copies went to a very select group of officers and civilian officials in the War and Navy Departments, the British Staff Mission, and the State Department. What is almost as interesting is the list of those not entitled to these top-level summaries: the vice president, any cabinet official outside the select few in the War, Navy, and State Departments, anyone in the Office of Strategic Services or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or anyone in the Manhattan Project building the atomic bomb, from Major General Leslie Groves on down.

The three daily summaries were called the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary, the "Magic" Far East Summary, and the European Summary. ("Magic" was a code word coined by the U.S. Army's chief signal officer, who called his code breakers "magicians" and their product "Magic." The term "Ultra" came from the British and has generally prevailed as the preferred term among historians, but in 1945 "Magic" remained the American designation for radio intelligence, particularly that concerning the Japanese.) The "Magic" Diplomatic Summary covered intercepts from foreign diplomats all over the world. The "Magic" Far East Summary presented information on Japan's military, naval, and air situation. The European Summary paralleled the Far East summary in coverage and need not detain us. Each summary read like a newsmagazine. There were headlines and brief articles usually containing extended quotations from intercepts and commentary. The commentary was critical: Since no recipient retained any back issues, it was up to the editors to explain how each day's developments fitted into the broader picture.

When a complete set of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary for the war years was first made public in 1978, the text contained a large number of redacted (literally whited out) passages. The critics reasonably asked whether the blanks concealed devastating revelations. Release of a nonredacted complete set in 1995 disclosed that the redacted areas had indeed contained a devastating revelation--but not about the use of the atomic bombs. Instead, the redacted areas concealed the embarrassing fact that Allied radio intelligence was reading the codes not just of the Axis powers, but also of some 30 other governments, including allies like France.

The diplomatic intercepts included, for example, those of neutral diplomats or attachés stationed in Japan. Critics highlighted a few nuggets from this trove in the 1978 releases, but with the complete release, we learned that there were only 3 or 4 messages suggesting the possibility of a compromise peace, while no fewer than 13 affirmed that Japan fully intended to fight to the bitter end. Another page in the critics' canon emphasized a squad of Japanese diplomats in Europe, from Sweden to the Vatican, who attempted to become peace entrepreneurs in their contacts with American officials. As the editors of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary correctly made clear to American policymakers during the war, however, not a single one of these men (save one we will address shortly) possessed actual authority to act for the Japanese government.

An inner cabinet in Tokyo authorized Japan's only officially sanctioned diplomatic initiative. The Japanese dubbed this inner cabinet the Big Six because it comprised just six men: Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, Army Minister Korechika Anami, Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, and the chiefs of staff of the Imperial Army (General Yoshijiro Umezu) and Imperial Navy (Admiral Soemu Toyoda). In complete secrecy, the Big Six agreed on an approach to the Soviet Union in June 1945. This was not to ask the Soviets to deliver a "We surrender" note; rather, it aimed to enlist the Soviets as mediators to negotiate an end to the war satisfactory to the Big Six--in other words, a peace on terms satisfactory to the dominant militarists. Their minimal goal was not confined to guaranteed retention of the Imperial Institution; they also insisted on preservation of the old militaristic order in Japan, the one in which they ruled.

The conduit for this initiative was Japan's ambassador in Moscow, Naotake Sato. He communicated with Foreign Minister Togo--and, thanks to code breaking, with American policymakers. Ambassador Sato emerges in the intercepts as a devastating cross-examiner ruthlessly unmasking for history the feebleness of the whole enterprise. Sato immediately told Togo that the Soviets would never bestir themselves on behalf of Japan. The foreign minister could only insist that Sato follow his instructions. Sato demanded to know whether the government and the military supported the overture and what its legal basis was--after all, the official Japanese position, adopted in an Imperial Conference in June 1945 with the emperor's sanction, was a fight to the finish. The ambassador also demanded that Japan state concrete terms to end the war, otherwise the effort could not be taken seriously. Togo responded evasively that the "directing powers" and the government had authorized the effort--he did not and could not claim that the military in general supported it or that the fight-to-the-end policy had been replaced. Indeed, Togo added: "Please bear particularly in mind, however, that we are not seeking the Russians' mediation for anything like an unconditional surrender."

This last comment triggered a fateful exchange. Critics have pointed out correctly that both Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew (the former U.S. ambassador to Japan and the leading expert on that nation within the government) and Secretary of War Henry Stimson advised Truman that a guarantee that the Imperial Institution would not be eliminated could prove essential to obtaining Japan's surrender. The critics further have argued that if only the United States had made such a guarantee, Japan would have surrendered. But when Foreign Minister Togo informed Ambassador Sato that Japan was not looking for anything like unconditional surrender, Sato promptly wired back a cable that the editors of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary made clear to American policymakers "advocate[s] unconditional surrender provided the Imperial House is preserved." Togo's reply, quoted in the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary of July 22, 1945, was adamant: American policymakers could read for themselves Togo's rejection of Sato's proposal--with not even a hint that a guarantee of the Imperial House would be a step in the right direction. Any rational person following this exchange would conclude that modifying the demand for unconditional surrender to include a promise to preserve the Imperial House would not secure Japan's surrender.

Togo's initial messages--indicating that the emperor himself endorsed the effort to secure Soviet mediation and was prepared to send his own special envoy--elicited immediate attention from the editors of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary, as well as Under Secretary of State Grew. Because of Grew's documented advice to Truman on the importance of the Imperial Institution, critics feature him in the role of the sage counsel. What the intercept evidence discloses is that Grew reviewed the Japanese effort and concurred with the U.S. Army's chief of intelligence, Major General Clayton Bissell, that the effort most likely represented a ploy to play on American war weariness. They deemed the possibility that it manifested a serious effort by the emperor to end the war "remote." Lest there be any doubt about Grew's mindset, as late as August 7, the day after Hiroshima, Grew drafted a memorandum with an oblique reference to radio intelligence again affirming his view that Tokyo still was not close to peace.

Starting with the publication of excerpts from the diaries of James Forrestal in 1951, the contents of a few of the diplomatic intercepts were revealed, and for decades the critics focused on these. But the release of the complete (unredacted) "Magic" Far East Summary, supplementing the Diplomatic Summary, in the 1990s revealed that the diplomatic messages amounted to a mere trickle by comparison with the torrent of military intercepts. The intercepts of Japanese Imperial Army and Navy messages disclosed without exception that Japan's armed forces were determined to fight a final Armageddon battle in the homeland against an Allied invasion. The Japanese called this strategy Ketsu Go (Operation Decisive). It was founded on the premise that American morale was brittle and could be shattered by heavy losses in the initial invasion. American politicians would then gladly negotiate an end to the war far more generous than unconditional surrender. Ultra was even more alarming in what it revealed about Japanese knowledge of American military plans. Intercepts demonstrated that the Japanese had correctly anticipated precisely where U.S. forces intended to land on Southern Kyushu in November 1945 (Operation Olympic). American planning for the Kyushu assault reflected adherence to the military rule of thumb that the attacker should outnumber the defender at least three to one to assure success at a reasonable cost. American estimates projected that on the date of the landings, the Japanese would have only three of their six field divisions on all of Kyushu in the southern target area where nine American divisions would push ashore. The estimates allowed that the Japanese would possess just 2,500 to 3,000 planes total throughout Japan to face Olympic. American aerial strength would be over four times greater.

From mid-July onwards, Ultra intercepts exposed a huge military buildup on Kyushu. Japanese ground forces exceeded prior estimates by a factor of four. Instead of 3 Japanese field divisions deployed in southern Kyushu to meet the 9 U.S. divisions, there were 10 Imperial Army divisions plus additional brigades. Japanese air forces exceeded prior estimates by a factor of two to four. Instead of 2,500 to 3,000 Japanese aircraft, estimates varied between about 6,000 and 10,000. One intelligence officer commented that the Japanese defenses threatened "to grow to [the] point where we attack on a ratio of one (1) to one (1) which is not the recipe for victory."

Concurrent with the publication of the radio intelligence material, additional papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been released in the last decade. From these, it is clear that there was no true consensus among the Joint Chiefs of Staff about an invasion of Japan. The Army, led by General George C. Marshall, believed that the critical factor in achieving American war aims was time. Thus, Marshall and the Army advocated an invasion of the Home Islands as the fastest way to end the war. But the long-held Navy view was that the critical factor in achieving American war aims was casualties. The Navy was convinced that an invasion would be far too costly to sustain the support of the American people, and hence believed that blockade and bombardment were the sound course.

The picture becomes even more complex than previously understood because it emerged that the Navy chose to postpone a final showdown over these two strategies. The commander in chief of the U.S. fleet, Admiral Ernest King, informed his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April 1945 that he did not agree that Japan should be invaded. He concurred only that the Joint Chiefs must issue an invasion order immediately to create that option for the fall. But King predicted that the Joint Chiefs would revisit the issue of whether an invasion was wise in August or September. Meanwhile, two months of horrendous fighting ashore on Okinawa under skies filled with kamikazes convinced the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, that he should withdraw his prior support for at least the invasion of Kyushu. Nimitz informed King of this change in his views in strict confidence.

In August, the Ultra revelations propelled the Army and Navy towards a showdown over the invasion. On August 7 (the day after Hiroshima, which no one expected to prompt a quick surrender), General Marshall reacted to weeks of gathering gloom in the Ultra evidence by asking General Douglas MacArthur, who was to command what promised to be the greatest invasion in history, whether invading Kyushu in November as planned still looked sensible. MacArthur replied, amazingly, that he did not believe the radio intelligence! He vehemently urged the invasion should go forward as planned. (This, incidentally, demolishes later claims that MacArthur thought the Japanese were about to surrender at the time of Hiroshima.) On August 9 (the day the second bomb was dropped, on Nagasaki), King gathered the two messages in the exchange between Marshall and MacArthur and sent them to Nimitz. King told Nimitz to provide his views on the viability of invading Kyushu, with a copy to MacArthur. Clearly, nothing that had transpired since May would have altered Nimitz's view that Olympic was unwise. Ultra now made the invasion appear foolhardy to everyone but MacArthur. But King had not placed a deadline on Nimitz's response, and the Japanese surrender on August 15 allowed Nimitz to avoid starting what was certain to be one of the most tumultuous interservice battles of the whole war.

What this evidence illuminates is that one central tenet of the traditionalist view is wrong--but with a twist. Even with the full ration of caution that any historian should apply anytime he ventures comments on paths history did not take, in this instance it is now clear that the long-held belief that Operation Olympic loomed as a certainty is mistaken. Truman's reluctant endorsement of the Olympic invasion at a meeting in June 1945 was based in key part on the fact that the Joint Chiefs had presented it as their unanimous recommendation. (King went along with Marshall at the meeting, presumably because he deemed it premature to wage a showdown fight. He did comment to Truman that, of course, any invasion authorized then could be canceled later.) With the Navy's withdrawal of support, the terrible casualties in Okinawa, and the appalling radio-intelligence picture of the Japanese buildup on Kyushu, Olympic was not going forward as planned and authorized--period. But this evidence also shows that the demise of Olympic came not because it was deemed unnecessary, but because it had become unthinkable. It is hard to imagine anyone who could have been president at the time (a spectrum that includes FDR, Henry Wallace, William O. Douglas, Harry Truman, and Thomas Dewey) failing to authorize use of the atomic bombs in this circumstance. Japanese historians uncovered another key element of the story. After Hiroshima (August 6), Soviet entry into the war against Japan (August 8), and Nagasaki (August 9), the emperor intervened to break a deadlock within the government and decide that Japan must surrender in the early hours of August 10. The Japanese Foreign Ministry dispatched a message to the United States that day stating that Japan would accept the Potsdam Declaration, "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler." This was not, as critics later asserted, merely a humble request that the emperor retain a modest figurehead role. As Japanese historians writing decades after the war emphasized, the demand that there be no compromise of the "prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler" as a precondition for the surrender was a demand that the United States grant the emperor veto power over occupation reforms and continue the rule of the old order in Japan. Fortunately, Japan specialists in the State Department immediately realized the actual purpose of this language and briefed Secretary of State James Byrnes, who insisted properly that this maneuver must be defeated. The maneuver further underscores the fact that right to the very end, the Japanese pursued twin goals: not only the preservation of the imperial system, but also preservation of the old order in Japan that had launched a war of aggression that killed 17 million.

This brings us to another aspect of history that now very belatedly has entered the controversy. Several American historians led by Robert Newman have insisted vigorously that any assessment of the end of the Pacific war must include the horrifying consequences of each continued day of the war for the Asian populations trapped within Japan's conquests. Newman calculates that between a quarter million and 400,000 Asians, overwhelmingly noncombatants, were dying each month the war continued. Newman et al. challenge whether an assessment of Truman's decision can highlight only the deaths of noncombatant civilians in the aggressor nation while ignoring much larger death tolls among noncombatant civilians in the victim nations.

There are a good many more points that now extend our understanding beyond the debates of 1995. But it is clear that all three of the critics' central premises are wrong. The Japanese did not see their situation as catastrophically hopeless. They were not seeking to surrender, but pursuing a negotiated end to the war that preserved the old order in Japan, not just a figurehead emperor. Finally, thanks to radio intelligence, American leaders, far from knowing that peace was at hand, understood--as one analytical piece in the "Magic" Far East Summary stated in July 1945, after a review of both the military and diplomatic intercepts--that "until the Japanese leaders realize that an invasion can not be repelled, there is little likelihood that they will accept any peace terms satisfactory to the Allies." This cannot be improved upon as a succinct and accurate summary of the military and diplomatic realities of the summer of 1945.

The displacement of the so-called traditionalist view within important segments of American opinion took several decades to accomplish. It will take a similar span of time to displace the critical orthodoxy that arose in the 1960s and prevailed roughly through the 1980s, and replace it with a richer appreciation for the realities of 1945. But the clock is ticking.


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sorry for the length, but tired of arguing over something social studies in 7th grade teaches
 
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